Abstract

[Abstract(Law)] A Study on Representative Collective Action for Competition Law

  • DATE WRITTEN : 2020-11-02
  • WRITER : APCC
  • VIEW : 1475
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It is hard to redress for consumers in mass harm situations where damaged consumers with nominal damages lack choices to the legal remedies under the current legal system. Collection actions refer to actions taken together by a group of people whose goal is to share litigation costs thereby creating economies of scale. For courts, the actions guarantee and enhance the victims¡¯ access to justice. This article analyses class-action antitrust lawsuits in the United States and the recent approach of the EU concerning its introduction to collective actions that stem from their own legal culture and experience with the law.

In order to introduce collective actions in the Korean competition legal arena, it may choose between the standard of the U.S. or the EU system, such as France and the United Kingdom, the Verbandsklage system. Given efficient private enforcement of competition law, the U.S. system prefers deterrence effect while the EU system seeks to ensure that anyone, who has suffered harm from a violation of competition law, can effectively exercise their right to claim full compensation.

Therefore, first and foremost, we should choose the main objective of the competition policy. We should place a priority on the deterrence effect of private enforcement of the competition law than anything else. Afterward, we should overcome weaknesses. There is even the Securities-Related lass Action Act(the ¡°Act¡±) ratified on May 28, 2013. We should rename the Act to the General Class Action Act and expand its scope allowing compensations for damages and losses in the event of cartels, abusive pricing in the market dominance or resale price maintenance. Besides, the act should guarantee an immediate appeal to be raised against a ruling of a transfer and that of the rejection of a request for transfer without delay.

Cases involving individuals who expect to recover nominal damages do not have the incentive to bring legal actions against the offenders. Because the damages an individual will receive are likely to be less than litigations costs and time he/she spends. Thus, allowing claimants to bring ¡°opt-out¡± collective actions before respondents allows claimants to bear less risk and save litigation costs, granting a wide range subject to the doctrine of Res Judicata. Moreover, the plaintiffs of a class action must appoint a counsel to mitigate the complexity of the actions and the court¡¯s burden. Under Article 56 of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (the ¡°Competition Law¡±), mutatis mutandis to the litigation shall apply to actions conducted by other co-litigants. As most collection actions are likely to be follow-on actions, the court should be permitted to request the Korean Fair Trade Commission to transmit the records of the case subject to the Competition Law. Furthermore, strong safeguards for the permission of the class actions are required and the Loser-Pay rule that requires a losing litigant to pay the winner¡¯s costs and attorney¡¯s fees should be applied so as to avoid unmeritorious litigations.
      
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