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This paper provides the design for effective deterrence of an antitrust surcharge system in Korea with comparison to EU, the UK, Germany and the U.S. (four competition authorities) cases. Accordingly, this paper reviews a deterrent approach and an internalization approach as a method for determining the optimum level of fines, and the objective of fines and legal grounds, and the nature of the fines will be discussed. It explores several steps in setting fines: (i) determination of base fines; (ii) adjustments (including aggravating and mitigating circumstances); and (iii) comparisons to limits. The concept of turnover rate and other factors is cited as the basis for calculating fines by the four competition authorities. To determine the amount of fines, the four competition authorities will consider aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Common situations include recidivism, business role in infringement, ranking of persons involved, cooperation with investigative authorities, and the existence of a compliance program. The legal framework of the four competition authorities provides for maximum fines. In addition, the four competition authorities are considering the scale of the project in some way. Finally, this paper proposes several policy recommendations to the KFTC. First, the purpose of imposing surcharge should be to deter anti-competitive activities and to change the method of surcharge accordingly. Second, the KFTC should balance deterrence with predictability. Third, the penalties imposed on corporate finance should be unified as surcharges. Fourth, the KFTC must consider the scale of the business when determining the level of the surcharge.
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